Tuesday, March 30, 2010

Biodefense Monograph

“Progress of ‘Biodefense for the 21st Century’ – A Five-Year Evaluation,” Chapter 3, Project on National Security Reform Case Studies Working Group Report, March 2012 (Originally presented on Thursday, January 15, 2009)

National strategies related to bioterrorism have emphasized a single approach to responding to a bioterror attack and assigned specific roles and responsibilities to discrete agencies, but there is limited evidence of real integration or oversight of these strategies. The NSC and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) both evaluate biological terrorism issues and recommend policy initiatives (international and domestic, respectively). Within the HSC, a senior director for biological defense addresses avian and pandemic influenza, and a joint NSC/HSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) exists to coordinate cross-agency efforts to counter biological threats. There is no evidence, however, that the PCC has an implementation strategy or has conducted actual oversight, critical evaluation, or integration of bioterrorism planning and response capabilities. The overall execution of the Biodefense Strategy has been disorganized and incoherent, resulting in gaps in protecting U.S. citizens and critical infrastructure against the threat of biological terrorism.

Thursday, March 25, 2010

Military Aspects of Chemical Warfare

"History of the Chemical Threat, Chemical Terrorism, and Its Implications for Military Medicine," chapter 4 of Military Aspects of Chemical Warfare, 2008.
by Jeffery K. Smart, Al Mauroni, Benjamin a. Hill Jr, and Allart B. Kok

This chapter is the third in the series of historical investigations into the use of chemicals as weapons, following Chapter 2, History of Chemical Warfare, which focuses on the history of chemical warfare on the battlefield, and Chapter 3, History of the medical management of Chemical Casualties, which describes the organizational management of the resultant casualties. Over the last 20 years, the nature of the chemical threat dramatically changed. This chapter outlines the historical progression of chemical weapon development, summarizes how conventional and unconventional agents may be delivered in the contexts of conventional conflict and terrorism, and addresses the status of current warfare capabilities in relation to the evolution and of international chemical warfare agreements.

Wednesday, March 24, 2010

Published Articles - 2006-2010

"Homeland Insecurity: Thinking About CBRN Terrorism," Homeland Security Affairs VI, no. 3, September 2010

"A Counter-WMD Strategy for the Future," U.S. Army's Parameters journal, Summer 2010, Vol. 40, No. 2.

"Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Aligning Capabilities with National Strategy," U.S. Army's Combating WMD Journal, Issue 4, 2010.

"Making Foreign Consequence Management Harder," Praeger Security International, September 2009

"Chem-Bio Weapon Threat: Do Not Exaggerate Capabilities of Nonstate Actors," Defense News, July 6, 2009

“The New Threat of Unconventional Warfare,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 4th Quarter 2008

There Is No ‘E’ in Combating WMD,” U.S. Army's Combating WMD Journal, Issue 2, 2008

“Responding to Bioterrorism: Are We On Course?” Praeger Security International, December 2007

“The Chemical Weapons Convention – Ten Years Later,” Praeger Security International, March 2007

“The Future of CBRN Defense,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 1st Quarter 2007

“The Chemical Corps’ Expanding Roles,” Army Chemical Review, January 2006